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I. DEFINING THE LONG WAR
On October 7, 2001, almost exactly a decade prior to the date of the
conference from which the following symposium contributions derive,
former President George W. Bush ordered airstrikes on Kabul and Kan-
dahar,' inaugurating hostilities in what has become the longest war in
U.S. history. By early December 2001, the Taliban had lost effective con-
trol over any significant part of Afghanistan's territory and with it any
plausible claim to represent Afghanistan's government under traditional
principles of international law.2 President Bush formally declared victory
on June 15, 2004, during a speech in which he praised Afghanistan's
interim leader and now President Hamid Karzai.3 But in reality the
armed conflict that began on October 7, 2001 (and according to some,
much earlier),4 has continued without interruption to date; indeed, on the
same day President Bush proclaimed victory, North Atlantic Treaty
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. This essay is a slightly
revised version of introductory remarks delivered at Ten Years In: Appraising the
International Law of the "Long War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Ten Years In), a
conference held at Boston University School of Law on October 14, 2011, and
cosponsored by the U.S. Naval War College and the American Society of
International Law's Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict. I acknowledge
with gratitude the research assistance of Amber Charles.
1 Bush Announces Opening of Attacks, CNN (Oct. 7, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/
2001-10-07/us/ret.attack.bushlqaeda-targets-al-kandahar?_s=PM:US.
2 See Aguilar-Amory & Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Tinoco Case) (Gr. Brit. v.
Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923), reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924).
1 Bush: Afghanistan is a Victory Over Terrorism, CNN (June 15, 2004),
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-06-15/us/karzai1 1hamid-karzai-afghanistan-afghan-
government? s=PM:US.
' See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 687-88 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing evidence dating the conflict back to 1996).
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Organization (NATO) forces came under renewed fire in Kabul.' What
began as an international armed conflict therefore became, and remains,
a non-international - or perhaps what should now be classified as a
transnational - armed conflict;6 and the Taliban's soldiers, once Afghan-
istan's de facto state army, now constitute the chief insurgents with whom
both the United States and the Karzai administration, at the time of this
publication, appear anxious to engage in peace talks.' The point of
emphasis, however, is that hostilities continue unabated.
Even more importantly, for the United States, the war in Afghanistan
is but one part of a broader conflict, and peace in Afghanistan will not
end that conflict. The Bush administration found it rhetorically and
legally expedient to refer to this as a "Global War on Terror,"8 or by
similar phrases. That characterization struck many, myself included, as
misguided and unhelpful at best, and probably even counterproductive.9
The Obama administration has since retired this appellation, but it per-
sists colloquially, and the current administration's decision to avoid the
phrase should not obscure the extent to which many (although certainly
not all) of the most controversial practices adopted as part of the "Global
War on Terror" by the Bush administration continue, or have even inten-
sified, following the change in administration in the United States.'o Fur-
thermore, apart from comparably problematic variations on "Global War
on Terror," it remains difficult to describe the diverse mosaic of hostili-
ties, law-enforcement activities, covert operations and other efforts to
combat what some would characterize broadly as a global struggle against
radical Islamist or. jihadist transnational terrorism." For this and other
reasons, many now refer to the broader conflict as "The Long War," a
phrase apparently first coined by General John P. Abizaid,12 former head
5 See Bush: Afghanistan is a Victory Over Terrorism, supra note 3.
6 For a discussion of transnational armed conflict as a new classification of armed
conflict, see Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities:
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 295 (2007).
7 See, e.g., Graham Bowley & Declan Walsh, Afghan Officials Consider Own Talks
With Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/world/
asia/afghan-officials-consider-separate-talks-with-taliban.html?pagewanted=all.
8 Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and
Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1850-51 (2010).
9 See Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 443, 447 & n.21 (2007).
10 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Leary Lecture, Aberrations No More, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
1085, 1098-99 (2010).
11 See W. Michael Reisman, Aftershocks: Reflections on the Implications of
September 11, 6 YALE Hum. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 81 (2003).
12 William Safire, Clean Your Clock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, http://www.ny
times.com/2006/03/12/magazine/312wwln safire.html. But see JAMES JAY CARAFANO
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of U.S. Central Command, and popularized by Benjamin Wittes's book
Law and the Long War,'3 among other recent works.
Ten Years In, like any conference exploring the emerging international
law of the Long War, could not accurately be confined to the Taliban or
Afghanistan. To understand how the law may be evolving, it must also
take into account the broader conflict, including but not limited to, "those
nations, organizations, or persons [whom the President] determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided, the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001.... in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organi-
zations or persons."1 4 For General Abizaid, among others, the idea of the
Long War doubtless connotes the fact that not only is the United States
involved in a long-term armed conflict in terms of time - by that mea-
sure, as noted, it is the longest war in U.S. history - but also that this war
is unlike any other in our history in terms of the nature and scope of the
enemy. Of course, that enemy includes the Afghani Taliban and al-
Qaeda. But the Long War is not limited either by the identity of those
initial enemies or by the territory of its initial battlefield - Afghanistan.
It arguably extends to, among other organizations and persons, al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), the Haqqani network (Pakistan), al-
Shabaab (Somalia) and "lone wolf" terrorists, including U.S. citizens.'"
And while Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began in Afghanistan,
today, the Department of Defense defines active "Other Locations" in
OEF to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan, the Philippines, the Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey,
& PAUL ROSENZWEIG, WINNING THE LONG WAR: LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR
FOR DEFEATING TERRORISM AND PRESERVING FREEDOM (2005).
13 BENJAMIN WirrEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE
AGE OF TERROR (2008).
14 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001).
15 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, At White House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/us/white-house-weighs-
limits-of-terror-fight.html?pagewanted=all; Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made
Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen. htmlpage
wanted=all; Saeed Shah, Why Pakistan Supports the Haqqani Network: Fear for Its
Own Security, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 28, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/
28/v-print/2429811/why-pakistan-supports-the-haqqanis.html; Scott Shane & Thom
Shanker, Strike Reflects U.S. Shift to Drones in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/awlaki-strike-shows-us-shift-to-drones-in-
terror-fight.html?pagewanted=all; see also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2010); Elise Labott & Carol Cratty, Obama Administration Debates
Releasing Awlaki Memo, CNN (Oct. 10, 2011, 8:52 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/
2011/10/10/obama-admin-debates-releasing-awlaki-memo/.
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Uzbekistan and Yemen. 6 Pakistan, of course, has long been part of the
equation, and many events - foremost among them the killing of Osama
bin Laden by a U.S. Navy SEAL raid on his compound in Abbotabad,
Pakistan, on May 2, 2011 - suggest that more terrorists actively planning
assaults on the United States may now reside (and hide) in Pakistan than
Afghanistan. Indeed, on April 15, 2009, former National Security Advi-
sor James L. Jones remarked that "the al-Qaeda presence [in Afghani-
stan] is very diminished. The maximum estimate is less than 100 operating
in the country. No bases. No ability to launch attacks on either us or our
allies."'
That said, John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, more recently reaffirmed,'s in a speech at
Harvard Law School, that the United States regards itself as in a war with
al-Qaeda, "but that it does not view [its] authority to use military force
against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields like
Afghanistan"; rather, it "ha[s] the authority to take action against al-
Qa'ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense
analysis each time."' 9 He also stressed that the United States "reserve[s]
the right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are
unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves," although
he hastened to add that this
[D]oes not mean that we can use military force whenever we want,
wherever we want. International law principles, including respect for
a state's sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important con-
straints on our ability to act unilaterally - and on the way in which
we can use force - in foreign territories.20
Still, what precisely does the Obama administration's legal position imply
about the scope of the conflict and the direction of international law?
Does it mean, as David Cole has suggested, that in theory Russia could
16 See U.S. Casualty Status as of April 6, 2012, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., http://www.
defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf.
17 Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Gen. James Jones, U.S. National Security
Advisor (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0912/
05/sitroom.01.html.
18 Legal Adviser to the State Department Harold Hongju Koh expressed much the
same view in his speech to the American Society of International Law on March 25,
2010. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor to the State Dept., Keynote Speech at
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 24, 2010),
available at http://harpers.org/media/image/blogs/misc/kohspeech.pdf.
19 John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and
Security: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sep. 16,
2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/
09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.
20 Id.
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start killing U.S. citizens with remote-controlled drone missiles based on
a determination by Dmitri Medvedev or Vladimir Putin, in secret, that
such citizens pose a threat to Russia's security? Surely Cole is right to
doubt that the United States would be prepared to "calmly pronounce
such actions compliant with the rule of law[.]" 21 But how then should the
boundaries of the emerging legal doctrine of targeted killing within a pur-
portedly global battlefield be drawn?
I do not mean to suggest that reasonable, legally defensible distinctions
cannot be drawn; only that it remains a continuing challenge for the law
of armed conflict in the twenty-first century, a challenge that interna-
tional lawyers (and politicians) neither can nor should elide. New battle-
fields, as William C. Banks has said, speaking literally and figuratively,
may indeed require the adaptation of old laws, both international and
constitutional.22 In the midst of this process, it is critical that we remain
mindful that how the United States delineates the contours of any new
doctrine in the law of war - relative to the jus ad bellum or the jus in
bello - may well be applied globally as well as, in future conflicts,
equally against the United States in perhaps unforeseeable contexts.
Areas of international law being shaped by state practice in the Long War
include, among many others: (i) the authority to detain unprivileged bel-
ligerents and how to define the category of persons subject to this
extraordinary deprivation; (ii) the rules and limits of interrogation in a
conflict in which timely intelligence is of paramount importance; (iii) the
nature and scope of the right to self-defense within the meaning of the
U.N. Charter in the twenty-first century, 23 an issue that has long been a
source of dispute because of the U.N. Charter's generally dysfunctional
collective security system, but that contemporary technology and threats
raise as never before; and (iv) the propriety of and process due in prose-
cutions brought against combatants and criminals before military com-
missions, national courts or both.
II. COSTS AND CASUALTIES
As context for the consideration of these and other diverse legal issues,
a brief overview of the factual landscape will be helpful at this stage. Per-
haps the proper place to begin, given the understandable focus in the
United States and abroad on the economy, is the Long War gargantuan
cost. For fiscal year 2012, about $107 billion dollars has been allocated in
21 David Cole, A Secret License to Kill, NPR BLOG (Sep. 19, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://
www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/sep/19/secret-license-kill/; see also David Cole,
Killing Our Citizens Without Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.ny
books.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/24/killing-our-citizens-without-trial/?pagination
=false.
22 See generally WILLIAM C. BANKS, NEW BA-TLEFIELDS/OLD LAWS: CRITICAL
DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (2011).
23 U.N. Charter art. 51.
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defense spending for the war in Afghanistan alone.2 4 Assuming the
Department of Defense receives this amount, cumulative monetary allo-
cations for the War in Afghanistan to date will reach about $557 billion,
which is about half of the approximately $1.415 trillion spent to date on
the Long War, broadly construed.2 5 Beyond military spending, the
United States has provided, and continues to provide, development assis-
tance to Afghanistan, having pledged nearly $56 billion since 2002.26
Indeed, international assistance has accounted for a staggering 75% of
Afghanistan's gross domestic product in recent years.2 7 Much of this
ostensible "development assistance," regrettably, will in fact be allocated
for security,28 one indicium of the extent to which war persists and
remains the foremost problem in much of Afghanistan.
Corruption, commonly described as "rampant"29 or "endemic,""o also
plagues Afghanistan. In 2010, one study found that one in seven Afghan
adults paid a bribe, 28% of which were handed over for the provision of
basic public services such as healthcare and education.3 ' The frequent
enlistment of private contractors to complete development projects in
Afghanistan also increases the difficulty of tracking the allocation and use
of funds.3 2 As the United States prepares to transition out of Afghani-
stan, Admiral Mike Mullen warned of the dangers posed by the corrup-
tion in key offices of the Afghan government, stressing that "we know
that some agencies and institutions vital to transition are infiltrated and
subverted by criminal patronage networks." 3 3 In short, the cost of mili-
24 Todd Harrison, Analysis of the FY2012 Def Budget, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS Vi (2011), available at http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/2011.07.16-FY-2012-Defense-Budget.pdf.
25 Amy Belasco, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33110, THE COST OF IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, at 3,
10 (2011). It should be noted, however, that the estimated total cost of $1.415 trillion
includes the war in Iraq, even though it is both unclear and controversial as to
whether or not that conflict qualifies as part of the Long War.
26 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AID AND CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN: ASIA
REPORT No210 - 4 AUGUST 2011, at 1 n.10 (2011).
27 See id. at 1.
28 See id. at 2 n.11.
29 Id. at 8.
30 Sayed Salahuddin, Analysis: Why Can't Afghanistan Tackle Corruption?,
REUTERS, Sep. 8, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/08/us-afghanistan-
corruption-analysis-idUSTRE6871KP20100908; see also Helene Cooper & Jeff
Zeleny, Obama Warns Karzai to Focus on Tackling Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/world/asia/03afghan.html.
31 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 26, at 14.
32 See id. at 19 ("U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad warned that wastage
associated with using contractors is 'now beginning to interfere with the credibility of
the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan."').
33 Admiral Mike Mullen, Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Address to the Troops
at International Security Assistance Force Headquarters Kabul (July 31, 2011),
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tary and other operations in Afghanistan alone remains extremely high,
and it will almost surely prove unsustainable if, as seems likely, the U.S.
and global economic recessions persist for years to come.
Furthermore, dollar amounts do not, of course, begin to convey the
true cost of the Long War. To date, over 1,800 U.S. service members
have died in Afghanistan alone.34 Of these, 306 took place in non-hostile
situations, and the balance represent casualties.3 5 More than 15,500
soldiers have been wounded in action, often severely.36 Hundreds have
required (sometimes multiple) amputations." While reliable records of
civilian casualties prove more difficult to come by, one estimate put the
number of Afghan civilians who have died from the conflict since 2007,
thus excluding the first six years of the conflict, at 10,000. Of these
deaths, 2,723 have been attributed to pro-government forces and 6,269 to
anti-government forces." The year 2010 saw the highest civilian death
toll in Afghanistan since 2006, a 28% increase from 2009." The war has
also taken a severe psychological toll on the U.S. armed forces. The
Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that 10-18% of returning ser-
vice members suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, and many others
suffer from mental health problems, alcoholism and drug abuse.40
III. CAsus BELLI - THEN AND Now
These financial and human costs compel us to revisit the Long War's
casus belli and its rationale(s). Most agree that it started with a clear and
legal objective. Al Qaeda launched a large-scale attack on the United
States, killing more than 3,000 civilians, from its former host state of
Afghanistan. Subject to determining the source of the attack, the United
available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/transcripts/uso-tour-commander-of-the-
joint-chiefs-of-staff-address-to-the-troops.html.
3 DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 16.
3 Id.
36 Id.
37 David Brown, Amputations and Genital Injuries Increase Sharply Amongst
Soldiers in Afghanistan, WASH. PosT, Mar. 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030403258.html.
38 Simon Rogers & Ami Sedghi, Afghanistan Civilian Casualties: Year by Year,




40 Mental Health Effects of Serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFF. http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/overview-mental-health-effects.
asp (last updated Dec. 20, 2011). For information regarding treatment rates of
soldiers with PTSD, indicating that in some studies only 20-30% of respondents who
tested positive for a mental disorder sought treatment, see Charles W. Hoge et al.,
Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care,
351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 13-22 (2004).
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States could, according to most (though, again, not all) participants in the
international legal system, engage in self-defense under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, as it did with the support of NATO and the apparent inter-
national legal countenance of the U.N. Security Council. The Council
passed several extraordinary resolutions that, inter alia, affirmed that the
attacks, despite originating from non-state actors, triggered the U.S. right
to individual and collective self-defense under the Charter.4 ' In 2002-
2003, however, the Bush administration complicated legal matters (and
international sympathies) by bringing Iraq into the picture. Whether by
error or, as the evidence suggests, deception in the service of extraneous
political and ideological objectives, it is now clear beyond a doubt that
Iraq under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein had no connection -
before the 2003 war at any rate - to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, nor pos-
session of weapons of mass destruction.
What, then, is the contemporary casus belli for the Long War, broadly
conceived? As noted, in Afghanistan today, fewer than 100 active Al
Qaeda members remain, with no plausible capacity to plan and carry out
attacks from the state.42 Yet troop levels in Afghanistan have increased
from about 38,000 to 100,000 since 2009, in large part because of the
Obama administration's decision, in December 2009, to approve a 30,000
service-member troop surge.4 3 Congress passed a bill funding the surge,
at a price of $33 billion, in June 2010.44 It is unclear that a troop surge of
the sort that has, accurately or not, been valorized in the context of Iraq
will be effective in Afghanistan. Critics note that the apparent similari-
ties between Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
are few and far between. To cite one prominent example, the success of
the troop surge in Iraq has been attributed to what some would describe
as the serendipitous coincidence of that surge with the "Sunni Awaken-
ing," while nothing commensurate has developed or seems likely in
Afghanistan.4' The continuing instability in Afghanistan has already led
some to conclude that the Afghanistan surge has failed. The chief reason,
some argue, is that, again in contrast to Iraq, there has not been a broad-
based civilian "buy-in," in large part because of the widespread percep-
41 See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sep. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001).
42 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
43 Barbara Starr, Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase, CNN (Feb. 17,
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-17/politics/obama.troops_1_afghanistan-troop-
increase-troop-levels?_s=PM:POLITICS; Kent Klein, Obama Cuts US 'Surge' Troops
in Afghanistan, VOA NEWS (June 22, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/
asia/Obama-Orders-Cuts-in-Surge-Troops-from-Afghanistan-124391954.html.
44 CHIP REID, House Passes Afghan Troop Surge Bill, CBS NEWS, July 27, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/27/world/main6718896.shtml.
45 David Sanger, Similarities to Iraq Surge Plan Mask Risks in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/world/05policy.html.
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tion among Afghan civilians of corruption in the Karzai government.46
Another significant factor appears to be the depth of civilian anger over
deaths and injuries caused by the war, even though most civilian casual-
ties have been caused by the Taliban, insurgents, road accidents and other
causes, not U.S. troops or government forces.4 7
IV. WINDING DOWN, SHIFTING TERRAIN
As of June 6, 2011, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
under NATO command in Afghanistan included almost 133,000 forces
from some 48 countries in addition to the United States, but only a few of
these states - Australia (1,550), Canada (2,922), France (3,935), Ger-
many (4,812), Poland (2,560) and the United Kingdom (9,500) - have
troops in Afghanistan that number in the thousands.48 The United King-
dom, the largest contributing ally, has only about a tenth as many troops
as the United States. In March 2010, President Obama announced a plan
to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in July 2011,49 and in an
effort to adhere to that deadline, on June 22, 2011, President Obama
announced the planned withdrawal of 10,000 troops by the end of 2011
and an additional 23,000 by the end of 2012.50 But it must be borne in
mind that because of the earlier troop surge, even if all goes as planned,
the net number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will be the about the same
at the end of the administration's first term as it had been when President
Obama took office.
Current plans indicate that the transition of power to the Afghan Army
should be complete by 2014." Some members of Congress have called
for an accelerated withdrawal, citing the cost of the war and significant
gains against enemy forces in Pakistan.5 2 Others caution that withdraw-
ing too quickly may enable the opposition to regroup and mobilize for a
renewed insurgency.53 Nevertheless, especially in light of the continuing
economic downturn, at this point the withdrawal has taken on an air of
46 John Wendle, The Limits of the Surge: Petraeus' Legacy in Afghanistan, Time,
Aug. 8, 2011, available at http://www.time.comltime/worldlarticle/0,8599,2087064,00.
html.
4 Id.
48 International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures, NATO, July 26,
2011, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/Revised%2026%2OJune
%202011%20Placemat%20(Full).pdf.
49 Obama: U.S. Can Start Withdrawing Troops from Afghanistan in July 2011,
CNN (May 12, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-12/politics/us.afghanistan.karzai
1_president-karzai-afghan-governments-afghanistan?_s=PM:POLITICS.
50 Id.
51 Klein, supra note 43.
52 Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, Obama to Announce Plans for Afghan Surge
Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/worldlasia/21
policy.html.
53 Klein, supra note 43.
2012] 573
574 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:565
inevitability. Following President Obama's announcement, several of the
states with the largest ISAF troop contributions, including the United
Kingdom, Canada and France, publicly announced plans to withdraw
their own forces." Yet in the final analysis, the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan may well be no more than symbolic, for the Long War
seems poised to continue unabated, and it has even intensified elsewhere,
including, in particular, in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia."5 A paramount
question for international law is whether an indefinite state of war -
indefinite in its territorial scope, temporal boundaries, nature and scope
of the enemy, indicia of "victory" and so forth - can be accommodated
by the existing laws of war, and, if not, what changes liberal states might
consider in the long term to deal on a continuing basis with what looks
less and less like a discrete war and increasingly like a pervasive feature
of the global security environment in the twenty-first century.
54 See, e.g., Britain, Germany, France All Plan Afghan Troop Withdrawals, VOA
NEWS (June 23, 2011) http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Britain-
Germany-France-All-Plan-Afghan-Troop-Withdrawals-124409819.html.
56 See, e.g., Jeremy Scahill, The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia, THE NATION, July 12,
2011, http://www.thenation.com/print/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia.
